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TESTING — AND MOSTLY REJECTING — THE FOLK WISDOM OF 
THE EFFECTIVE APPELLATE BRIEF† 
STEVEN R. MORRISON* AND BRIAN DARBY** 
ABSTRACT 
There is a great deal of folk wisdom regarding how to draft an effective 
appellate brief. Judges and lawyers offer advice that briefs should be short, 
should present relatively few issues, should always be followed by a reply brief, 
and so forth. There is little doubt that aspiring appellate advocates, law 
professors who teach writing, appellate court clerks, and appellate court judges 
look to this folk wisdom to learn how to write effective appellate briefs, teach 
the skill, and evaluate, by proxies, which briefs are likely to be the best. 
But this folk wisdom has never been empirically tested. We do so in this 
article. We examined all cases in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals that 
resulted in an opinion in 2016, coding for many of the variables that the folk 
wisdom discusses. We also coded for the type of holding and type of opinion that 
the Eighth Circuit published as our dependent variables. 
The result was that much of the folk wisdom, in our dataset at least, was not 
statistically supported. We did, however, find some statistically significant 
correlations between our independent and dependent variables. These results 
will help to inform the attorneys, professors, clerks, and courts that work with 
appellate briefs every day. It will help these people draft, teach, and evaluate 
appellate briefs. It will also further the inquiry into effective appellate writing 
by calling into question the accepted folk wisdom, and thus opening the doors 
for other avenues of research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a lot of folk wisdom about the characteristics of successful appellate 
briefs. It is said that shorter briefs and fewer issues lead to greater appellate 
success. Bryan Garner has recommended that issue statements not exceed 
seventy-five words. Given his recommendation to include a major premise, 
minor premise, and conclusion, it would appear that his ideal issue statement 
isn’t fewer than, say, twenty-five words. Some claim that simple, short 
arguments are more effective than longer ones. Many attorneys wonder whether 
participating in oral argument and submitting reply briefs have any effect on 
appeal success. And appellate cases are supposed to be driven by the law, not 
the factual complexities of a case. Until now, this folk wisdom has remained 
empirically untested. In this article, we set forth the results of a quantitative 
analysis of appellate briefs we performed that tests much of this folk wisdom. 
Our data set is all 1,123 cases that resulted in a decision by the Eighth Circuit 
in 2016. We chose this data set because it was the most recent full calendar year 
as of the start of this research, and because we reside in and one of us practices 
in the Eighth Circuit. There are at least three potential representativeness 
problems with this dataset. First, it is a snapshot of only one year. 2016 in the 
Eighth Circuit may have been an anomaly. Second, it surveys only the Eighth 
Circuit, which may value aspects of appellate briefs differently than other federal 
circuits. Third, it surveys only a federal court. State appellate courts (whether 
intermediate or supreme) may treat appellate briefs differently. 
Nevertheless, we believe that this dataset can provide at least a basis for 
understanding when, if ever, the anecdotal folk wisdom about appellate briefs is 
valid. Certainly this dataset will say much about the Eighth Circuit today. It will, 
perhaps, say less about other circuits and the Eighth Circuit in the distant past. 
And it may say even less about appellate briefs in state courts. 
This is primarily a descriptive project. It pulls its data from appellants’ 
original briefs, the Eighth Circuit’s general docket sheet for each case, and the 
Eighth Circuit’s judgment and opinion in these cases. It compiles data on most 
things in these briefs that are readily quantifiable and likely to be relevant, given 
the prevailing folk wisdom. It also includes whether oral argument was held, 
whether the appellant filed a reply brief, what type of opinion the Eighth Circuit 
issued, and the holding of that opinion. 
This article considers only appellants’ briefs, not appellee’s response briefs. 
Where there is a cross-appeal, this article considers only the briefs of the first 
appellant. This approach is necessary to ensure continuity of coding from case 
to case, and it is appropriate because most of the time the appellee wins the 
appeal. It is usually not difficult for the appellee to convince the Eighth Circuit 
that a lower court got it right. Since this article seeks to uncover the 
characteristics of effective briefs, it makes sense to focus on the briefs that the 
Eighth Circuit, given its large affirmance rate, treats with the most skepticism. 
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This article takes the following route. Part I provides a review of the relevant 
literature. In broad strokes, this section shows that there is a substantial body of 
empirical scholarship on appellate courts and much folk wisdom regarding the 
variables to be evaluated in this article, but no empirical data to support that folk 
wisdom. Part II describes the empirical study that we performed, detailing the 
theories to be tested, null and alternative hypotheses, target and sample 
population of cases, methodology for collecting data, identification of data 
sources, and variables and their codes. Part III reports the results of this study 
and describes any significant relationship between variables and case outcome. 
The conclusion departs from this article’s descriptive bent to hypothesize why 
these significant relationships exist and what these relationships might mean. 
The conclusion also plots a course for future research. 
I.  REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
There is a good deal of empirical scholarship on appeals. It includes studies 
on appellate treatment of jury verdicts1; the effect of judges’ complex social 
background on their decisionmaking2; the impact of trial courts’ deference to 
appellate rulings3; the impact of judges’ policy preferences and strategic 
calculations in an en banc setting4; a general empirical description of criminal 
appeals’ outcomes5; judicial activism6; the harmless error doctrine in criminal 
appeals7; the effect of mental heuristics and “cognitive illusions” on judicial 
decisionmaking8; the effect of judges’ political ideologies9; the effect of “pathos-
based” storytelling on appellate decisionmaking10; and others.11 
 
 1. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial: Defendants’ 
Advantage, 3 AM. L. AND ECON. REV.  125 (2001). 
 2. Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise, & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the 
Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998). 
 3. Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U. CHIC. L. REV. 
643 (2005). 
 4. Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635 (1998). 
 5. Michael Heise, Federal Criminal Appeals: A Brief Empirical Perspective, 93 MARQ. L. 
REV. 825 (2009). 
 6. Corey Rayburn Yung, Flexing Judicial Muscle: An Empirical Study of Judicial Activism 
in the Federal Courts, 105 N.W. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
 7. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Harmless Error, 30 J. LEGAL STUD., 161 (2001). 
 8. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 777, 780, 784 (2001). 
 9. Corey Rayburn Yung, Judged by the Company You Keep: An Empirical Study of the 
Ideologies of Judges on the United States Courts of Appeals, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1133 (2010). 
 10. Kenneth D. Chestek, Judging By the Numbers: An Empirical Study of The Power of Story, 
7 J ALWD 2 (2010). 
 11. JONATHAN MATTHEW COHEN, INSIDE APPELLATE COURTS: THE IMPACT OF COURT 
ORGANIZATION ON JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 
(2002); Robert Anderson IV, Law, Fact, and Discretion in the Federal Courts: An Empirical Study 
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While these studies provide insight into how courts of appeals operate,12 
they have never considered the effect of the appellate brief itself. This is an 
important gap because, on appeal, parties usually have only two avenues of 
communication to the courts: the briefs they draft, and the short oral arguments 
that build upon those briefs. The empirical scholarship on appeals offers little 
insight into how to best draft this most important of appellate documents. 
That is not to say that the literature is short on opinions. Folk wisdom about 
how to draft an appellate brief abounds: 
Number of sources. Judge Richard Posner suggests that citing fewer sources 
is better than citing more sources, because lawyers should not “beat [judges] 
over the head with statutory language and precedent.”13 A set of law clerks for 
the South Carolina Court of Appeals offered that appellate lawyers should 
“avoid lengthy examples, voluminous case law without explanatory 
parentheticals, and extraneous information.”14 Belinda I. Mathie recommends 
that lawyers “[c]hoose [their] citations with care . . . Bogging down your brief 
with extraneous and unnecessary citations creates more work than necessary for 
the court and reduces your room to make substantive arguments.”15 And a 
 
2012 UTAH L. REV. 1 (2012); Jeffrey A. Berger & Tracey E. George, Judicial Entrepreneurs on 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals: A Citation Analysis of Judicial Influence 1 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch., 
Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 05-24, 2005), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=789544.; Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and 
Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 
2155 (1998); Frank B. Cross, Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 
1457 (2003); Sue Davis, Susan Haire, & Donald R. Songer, Voting Behavior and Gender on the 
U.S. Court of Appeals, 77 JUDICATURE 129 (1993); Ward Farnsworth, The Role of Law in Close 
Cases: Some Evidence From the Federal Courts of Appeals, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 1083 (2006); Chris 
Guthrie & Tracey E. George, The Futility of Appeal: Disciplinary Insights Into the “Affirmance 
Effect” on the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 357 (2005); Jonathan P. 
Kastellec, Racial Diversity and Judicial Influence on Appellate Courts, 57 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 167 
(2013); Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Investigation Into Appellate 
Structure and the Perceived Quality of Appellate Review, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1745 (2008). 
 12. But see Hon. Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies 
That Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 
1899-1900 (2009) (questioning the value of empirical legal studies “to understand the effect of 
extralegal factors on appellate decisionmaking”). 
 13. Hon. Richard A. Posner, Effective Appellate Brief Writing, http://apps.americanbar.org/lit 
igation/litigationnews/trial_skills/appellate-brief-writing-posner.html [https://perma.cc/Y3F5-NT 
HR] (last visited Dec. 9, 2018). 
 14. H. Bruce Williams, Top Ten Tips for Appellate Brief Writing from Appellate Law Clerks: 
“Help Us Help You”, LCBA CLE, Nov. 1, 2012, available at http://www.lex-co.sc.gov/depart 
ments/DeptIQ/mie/Documents/OrderWritingTips.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JZA-HX5H]. 
 15. Belinda I. Mathie, Writing Appellate Briefs, for Young Lawyers, 29 APP. PRAC. 1, 2 (2010), 
available at https://www.kattenlaw.com/files/22105_Mathie_AppellatePractice_WritingBriefs.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WE5A-2N54]. 
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former Federal Circuit law clerk recommends avoiding “long string cites of 
cases.”16 
Number of issues. Judge Jane R. Roth and one of her former law clerks 
advise that lawyers “should limit the number of issues . . . a limited set of issues 
presenting only viable arguments is best . . . Occasionally, an advocate will 
present ten or fifteen issues in her brief. This is an automatic warning flag that 
the advocate does not understand what the case is about or that she hopes to hide 
the weakness of the appeal under a flurry of words.”17 Similarly, Belinda I. 
Mathie advises that lawyers “be selective about the issues [they] present on 
appeal . . . [and] not devote time or space to discussion of marginal points.”18 It 
has also been suggested that “[t]here is such a thing as too many issues.”19 Judge 
Ruggero Aldisert observed that lawyers who present more than three issues 
suffer a credibility loss, and that when a lawyers presents eight issues, there is a 
“strong presumption that no point is worthwhile.”20 Other judges seem to find a 
red line at three issues: more than that, and these judges view the brief with 
suspicion.21 Judge S. Jay Plager of the Federal Circuit offered that he could not 
remember sitting on any case that was decided by the “ninth or tenth ‘Question 
Presented,’ and in part that may be because [he couldn’t] ever remember having 
read that far into the ‘Question Presented.’”22 And a former Federal Circuit clerk 
observed that the statement of the issues is “rarely helpful” because lawyers 
“present too many issues and the issues are too long and too argumentative.”23 
Words per issue. Where this Federal Circuit clerk recommended that each 
issue should be short (“a sentence or two”24), Bryan Garner recommends that 
issue statements should not exceed seventy-five words.25 He proposes a major 
premise-minor premise-conclusion organization, which is usually feasible 
within the seventy-five-word limit. The Georgetown University Law Center 
Writing Center recommends issues of one sentence, which should be no longer 
 
 16. Rachel Clark Hughey, Effective Appellate Advocacy before the Federal Circuit: A Former 
Law Clerk’s Perspective, 11 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 401, 411 (2010). 
 17. Hon. Jane R. Roth & Mani S. Walia, Persuading Quickly: Tips for Writing an Effective 
Appellate Brief, 11 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 443, 454 (2010). 
 18. Mathie, supra note 15, at 1. 
 19. Robert B. Dubose, Appellate Brief Writing: Making a Brief Helpful and Persuasive, 
STATE BAR COLLEGE SUMMER SCHOOL 2007, at 4, available at http://www.adjtlaw.com/assets/ 
Brief%20Writing.Dubose.2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7EE-QBUA]. 
 20. JUDGE RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, WINNING ON APPEAL: BETTER BRIEFS AND ORAL 
ARGUMENT 120 (rev. 1st ed. 1996). 
 21. Hughey, supra note 16, at 417. 
 22. S. Jay Plager, J., Remarks, Sixteenth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 193 F.R.D. 263, 277 (1999). 
 23. Hughey, supra note 16, at 408. 
 24. Id. at 409. 
 25. BRYAN A. GARNER, THE WINNING BRIEF: 100 TIPS FOR PERSUASIVE BRIEFING IN TRIAL 
AND APPELLATE COURTS 104 (3d ed. 2014). 
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than three to four lines.26 Assuming each line contains an average of thirteen 
words, Georgetown recommends issues of no more than fifty-two words. The 
examples that it provides suggests that issue statements much shorter than that 
are appropriate.27 
Statement of facts. It is common advice that the statement of facts should 
include all of the legally relevant facts, even if they do not favor one’s client,28 
and that the statement of facts should tell an interesting and complete story.29 At 
the same time, a lawyer should not waste space.30 Thus, one should “think about 
proportion — the Statement of Facts generally should not take up too much of 
[a lawyer’s] allotted space.”31 Extremely short statements of facts, therefore, 
may be less effective, as might very long statements of facts. A statement of 
some middling length should be ideal. 
Overall length of brief. Bryan Garner, among his many words of wisdom, 
suggests, in many ways, that shorter legal writing is better.32 Judge Richard 
Posner is more pointed, arguing that briefs should be just that — brief.33 Judge 
Daniel M. Friedman wrote that “[t]he shorter the brief, the more effective it will 
be.”34 Federal Circuit Judge Alvin A. Schall wrote that briefs should “be as 
concise as possible.”35 And the former Federal Circuit clerk reported that 
“almost every opening brief in a patent case approached the word limit, which 
seemed to [her] to indicate that attorneys sometimes forget that their case is not 
the only appeal before the court.”36 
Reply briefs. Posner also recommends that attorneys “not forgo the 
opportunity to file a reply brief. The appellee is bound to make some halfway 
decent points in rebuttal . . . Don’t let him or her have the last word.”37 Another 
 
 26. The Writing Center, Georgetown University Law Center, Persuasive Issue Statements, at 
4 (2015), available at https://www.law.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Geenberg-
Weingast-Issue-Statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5SN-A3RJ]. 
 27. Id. at 8. 
 28. Hon. Jane R. Roth & Mani S. Walia, Persuading Quickly: Tips for Writing an Effective 
Appellate Brief, 11 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 443, 445 (2010); The Writing Center, Georgetown 
University Law Center, Writing a Statement of Facts in an Appellate Brief, at 2 (2014), available 
at https://www.law.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/StatementofFactsinaBriefFi 
nal.pdf [https://perma.cc/DV73-6XLD]. 
 29. Roth & Walia, supra note 28; The Writing Center, supra note 28, at 3–4. 
 30. The Writing Center, supra note 28, at 4. 
 31. Id. at 4. 
 32. BRYAN A. GARNER, LEGAL WRITING IN PLAIN ENGLISH, 24, 27–29, 50, 78, 146, 147 
(2013) (arguing for omitting needless words, simplifying wordy phrases, summarizing rather than 
overparticularizing, keeping sentences short, and creating ample white space on the page). 
 33. Posner, supra note 13. 
 34. Daniel M. Friedman, Winning on Appeal, 9 LITIG. 15, 18 (Spring 1983). 
 35. Alvin A. Schall, Remarks, Eleventh Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 153 F.R.D. 177, 196 (1993). 
 36. Hughey, supra note 16, at 415. 
 37. Posner, supra note 13. 
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commentator has suggested that while reply briefs are usually optional, “there 
are very few — if any — circumstances that justify the decision to forgo the 
chance to file a reply.”38 
Oral arguments. A former Eighth Circuit law clerk argued that “[o]ral 
argument can be critical, but only in a very small percentage of cases,”39 and 
that for all cases but a few, “oral argument should not be granted at all.”40 A 
former Federal Circuit law clerk, however, suggested, that “[w]hile the brief is 
very important, the oral argument still matters.”41 A number of judges on the 
Federal Circuit, as reported by this law clerk, expressed that oral argument 
matters to them.42 They do not, however, say that it unilaterally helps or hurts 
the appellant; rather, it can serve to clarify the case for them. 
These experienced judges, clerks, and lawyers certainly have a wealth of 
personal experience with effective appellate brief writing, but it is possible that 
their views are clouded by their own personal preferences, which may have little 
to do with whether following their advice will demonstrably lead to greater 
success. This article aims to test these claims, to determine whether they do, in 
fact, produce more “effective” briefs — by which we mean briefs that result in 
the reviewing court’s opinion and holding being more favorable to the appellant 
who has submitted the brief. 
II.  DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AND METHODS 
A. Our Study’s Central Question and Eight Research Hypotheses 
Our study aims to test the folk wisdom around successful appellate briefs. 
We therefore identified the quantifiable aspects of briefs that the folk wisdom 
would impact, coded for those aspects, and compared this data to the coded data 
for the Eighth Circuit’s holding and opinion. As the aim of our study is 
multifaceted, so too are the theories. The literature suggests eight hypotheses: 
 A brief with fewer cited sources, all other things being equal, should be 
more successful than a brief with more cited sources; 
 A brief with fewer issues, all other things being equal, should be more 
successful than a brief with more issues; 
 
 38. Richard C. Kraus, Crafting an Influential and Effective Reply Brief, APP. ISSUES, ABA 
COUNSEL OF APPELLATE LAWYERS, at 1 (Summer 2012), available at https://www.americanbar. 
org/content/dam/aba/publications/appellate_issues/2012sum_ai.pdf [https://perma.cc/MHZ4-Q9 
EV]. 
 39. Michael Duvall, When Is Oral Argument Important? A Judicial Clerk’s View of the 
Debate, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 121, 130 (2007). 
 40. Id. at 121. 
 41. Hughey, supra note 16, at 426. 
 42. Id. at 426-27. 
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 There is a significant drop in success between briefs that present three 
issues and briefs that present four issues; 
 Briefs that present issues that are set forth in more than seventy-five 
words, all other things being equal, should be less successful than briefs 
that present issues that are set forth in seventy-five words or less; 
 The success rate of briefs, evaluated against the length of the briefs’ 
statement of the case, will appear as something of a bell curve, where the 
highest success rate is found somewhere between the briefs with the 
shortest and longest statements of the case; 
 A brief that is, overall, shorter, all other things being equal, should be 
more successful than a brief that is, overall, longer; 
 An appellant who files a reply brief should, all other things being equal, 
be more successful than an appellant who does not file a reply brief; and 
 Holding an oral argument should, all other things being equal, benefit the 
success of an appellant brief. 
In each case, the null hypothesis is that each feature of the brief has no effect on 
the success of an appellant brief. 
B. Study Design 
Variables 
We surveyed all 1,123 cases that resulted in a decision by the Eighth Circuit 
in 2016. We first compiled a list of most of the variables in an appellant’s 
original brief that are readily quantifiable and that appear in the literature as 
relevant to a brief’s effectiveness. We do not, therefore, code for an issue’s 
standard of review, the legal basis for an issue, whether an appellant must show 
prejudice, and so forth. These are substantive aspects of an appeal that 
sometimes cannot be easily discerned or quantified. We also did not code for 
many things that other researchers have covered. The U.S. Appeals Courts 
Database, for example, codes for type of case (criminal, constitutional, etc.), 
whether a panel or en banc court heard the case, and many others.43 The Supreme 
Court database is similarly wide-ranging.44 We cover ground that has not yet 
been covered by these databases or any other project. 
These codes and their variable are available in the codebook, found below 
in Appendix A. There are three dependent variables and nine independent 
variables, plus one identification variable (CASENUM, which is the Eighth 
Circuit’s assigned case number, e.g. 16-1907). 
 
 43. U.S. Appeals Courts Database, THE JUD. RES. INITIATIVE AT THE U. OF S.C., 
http://artsandsciences.sc.edu/poli/juri/appct.htm [https://perma.cc/9L2V-BUXP]. 
 44. The Supreme Court Database, WASH. U. LAW, http://www.supremecourtdatabase.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/H2QK-HFPR]. 
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The primary dependent variable in this study is HOLDING, which reflects 
the “success” of an appellant’s original brief based on eleven possible outcomes 
taken from the Appellate Court Database: (0) Stay, petition, or motion grants, 
(1) Affirmed, or affirmed and petition denied, (2) Reversed (including reversed 
and vacated), (3) Reversed and remanded (or just remanded), (4) Vacated and 
remanded (also set aside and remanded, or modified and remanded), (5) 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part (or modified, or affirmed and modified), 
(6) Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, or affirmed in part, vacated 
in part, and remanded, (7) Vacated, (8) Petition denied or appeal dismissed, (9) 
Certification to another court, and (10) Not ascertained.45 From these data, a 
ranked response variable HOLDINGRANK was computed as (from most to 
least “successful,”): (1) HOLDING of 2, 3, 4, or 7; (2) HOLDING of 5 or 6; and 
(3) HOLDING of 1 or 8. Thus, to be clear, the ten HOLDING categories have 
been reduced to three HOLDINGRANK categories. 
The OPINION is also a dependent variable because it reflects an appellant’s 
“success,” albeit more weakly than HOLDING because it expresses how the 
court reached its conclusion, rather than the conclusion itself. OPINION 
expresses, possibly, the strength of the HOLDING. Of six possible outcomes, 
the dataset saw five of them realized. The strength of the court’s expression of 
its OPINION, from strongest to weakest, is (1) per curiam; (2) signed, 
unanimous; (3) signed, with concurrence; (4) signed, with concurrence and 
dissent; and (5) signed, with dissent. OPINIONRANK is the ranked response 
variable and has the same values as OPINION. 
Thus, the HOLDING and OPINION dependent variables combine to 
produce twenty potential outcomes (with eleven different ranks), analyzed as 
OUTCOMERANK. From most successful to least successful, they are: 
1 = Per curiam reversed; reversed and remanded/vacated; vacated; 
remanded; or vacated and remanded (where OPINION=1 and 
HOLDINGRANK=1 [thus a HOLDING=2, 3, 4, or 7]). 
2 = Signed, unanimous reversed; reversed and remanded/vacated; vacated; 
remanded; or vacated and remanded (where OPINION=2 and 
HOLDINGRANK=1); 
3 = Signed, with concurrence reversed; reversed and remanded/vacated; 
vacated; remanded; or vacated and remanded (where OPINION=3 and 
HOLDINGRANK=1); 
4 = Signed, with concurrence and dissent reversed; reversed and 
remanded/vacated; vacated; remanded; or vacated and remanded 
(where OPINION=6 and HOLDINGRANK=1); 
 
 45. HOLDINGS 0, 9, and 10 did not occur in our dataset. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2019] TESTING — AND MOSTLY REJECTING — THE FOLK WISDOM 301 
5 = Signed, with dissent reversed; reversed and remanded/vacated; 
vacated; remanded; or vacated and remanded (where OPINION=4 and 
HOLDINGRANK=1); 
6 = Per curiam affirmed in part and reversed in part (where OPINION=1 
and HOLDING=5); 
6 = Signed, unanimous affirmed in part and reversed in part (where 
OPINION=2 and HOLDING=5); 
6 = Signed, with concurrence affirmed in part and reversed in part (where 
OPINION=3 and HOLDING=5); 
6 = Signed, with concurrence and dissent affirmed in part and reversed in 
part (where OPINION=6 and HOLDING=5); 
6 = Signed, with dissent affirmed in part and reversed in part (where 
OPINION=4 and HOLDING=5); 
6 = Per curiam affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded (where 
OPINION=1 and HOLDING=6); 
6 = Signed, unanimous affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded 
(where OPINION=2 and HOLDING=6); 
6 = Signed, with concurrence affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded (where OPINION=3 and HOLDING=6);  
6 = Signed, with concurrence and dissent affirmed in part, reversed in part, 
and remanded (where OPINION=6 and HOLDING=6); 
6 = Signed, with dissent affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded 
(where OPINION=4 and HOLDING=6); 
7 = Signed, with dissent affirmance, petition denied, or appeal dismissed 
(where OPINION=4 and HOLDINGRANK=3 [thus a HOLDING=1 
or 8]); 
8 = Signed, with concurrence and dissent affirmance, petition denied, or 
appeal dismissed (where OPINION=6 and HOLDINGRANK=3); 
9 = Signed, with concurrence affirmance, petition denied, or appeal 
dismissed (where OPINION=3 and HOLDINGRANK=3); 
10 =  Signed, unanimous affirmance, petition denied, or appeal dismissed 
(where OPINION=2 and HOLDINGRANK=3); 
11 = Per curiam affirmance, petition denied, or appeal dismissed (where 
OPINION=1 and HOLDINGRANK=3). 
Because our study is a purely quantitative one that examines appellate briefs, 
there are two weaknesses that should be noted here. First, for cases that result in 
a partial affirmance and partial reversal, we do not examine the nature of that 
split decision. We cannot, therefore, discern the variable rates of “success” 
among these decisions. Thus, the ten outcomes above with a HOLDING of 5 or 
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6 produce the same OUTCOMERANK of 6. Second, while an appellant 
normally hopes that the court will reverse/vacate or remand the case, this is not 
a uniformly positive outcome. The court may reverse/vacate or remand a case 
for reasons other than those for which the appellant requested these outcomes. 
Our study does not account for those (probably relatively rare) cases. 
There are nine independent variables, excluding CASENUM, which is an 
identification variable and simply lists the case number assigned to the case by 
the Eighth Circuit. 
NUMSCRS lists the number of sources cited in the appellant’s table of 
authorities (integers from 2 to 133, median=29). This study examines only an 
appellant’s original briefs that were written by lawyers, so if a brief is 
unavailable or non-existent, “Briefs unavail” is listed in the NUMSCRS column 
of the Excel spreadsheet on which we compiled the data; if a brief is pro se, “Pro 
se” is listed; and if a brief is an Anders brief (which is a required brief written in 
a criminal appeal when the attorney believes there are no viable issues to be 
argued), “Anders” is listed. Eliminating these cases from the original dataset 
resulted in our edited, operative dataset of 737 cases. 
NUMISSUES lists the number of issues stated in the statement of the issues 
(integers from 1 to 19, median=2). 
WDSPERISS lists the average number of words per issue, as listed in 
NUMISSUES (numbers from 6 to 320, median=30.5). 
STMTPAGES lists the number of pages that the statement of the case covers 
(integers from 0 to 39, median=5). This number is calculated by subtracting the 
page on which the statement begins from the page on which it ends. For 
statements that appear on only one page, therefore, 0 is entered. 
ARGPAGES lists the number of pages that the argument section covers 
(integers from 2 to 64, median=14). It is calculated the same way that 
STMTPAGES is calculated. 
PGPERARG lists the average number of argument pages per issue, taken by 
dividing ARGPAGES by NUMISSUES (numbers from 0.375 to 52, median=7). 
TOTALWDS lists the number of words in the entire brief, as reported by 
counsel in the brief’s certificate of compliance (integers from 1150 to 20572, 
median=5930). Where the length is reported by pages, that number is multiplied 
by 230 to produce an approximate word count. Where the length is reported by 
line numbers, that number is multiplied by 13 to produce an approximate word 
count. Where the brief itself contain no indication of its length, the Eighth 
Circuit’s general docket lists the brief’s number of pages; that number is 
multiplied by 230 to produce an approximate word count. 
REPLY lists whether or not a reply brief was filed (No=0, Yes=1). 
ARGHELD lists whether or not an oral argument was held (No=0, Yes=1). 
This does not differentiate between cases in which the appellant requested or did 
not request an oral argument, nor does it differentiate between cases in which 
the court initially declined to screen for an oral argument or screened for or 
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scheduled an oral argument but later changed the case’s status to a no-argument 
case. This variable simply lists whether the argument was held or not. 
OPINION lists the type of opinion the court issued: per curiam; signed, 
unanimous; signed, with concurrence; signed, with dissent; or signed, with 
concurrence and dissent (whether one judge concurred and a separate judge 
dissented or one judge concurred in part and dissented in part). 
HOLDING lists the court’s disposition of the case, including, among others: 
affirmed; reversed; affirmed in part and reversed in part; and so forth. 
Statistical Analysis 
Data exploration46 was conducted with a scatterplot matrix of the seven 
numerical explanatory variables (NUMSRCS, NUMISSUES, WDSPERISS, 
STMTPAGES, ARGPAGES, PGPERARG, and TOTALWDS) along with 
contingency tables of the two categorical dependent variables (REPLY and 
ARGHELD). We also fit each of the seven numerical explanatory variables to 
one of three statistical distributions: log-normal, negative binomial, and gamma, 
using Pearson’s χ2 / DF as a measure of goodness-of-fit. 
Each of the ranked response variables (HOLDINGRANK, 
OPINIONRANK, and OUTCOMERANK) were analyzed with a generalized 
linear model47 with the multinomial ranked responses linked as cumulative 
logit/proportional odds and the fixed (explanatory) variables determined by 
stepwise selection. The response variables HOLDINGRANK and 
OUTCOMERANK are ordinal in the sense that they are coded so that lower 
values are considered “more successful,” (or “stronger”, in the case of 
OPINIONRANK). This means that the multinomial cumulative logit link 
models the log-odds ratio of accomplishing a lower-valued response variable, 
relative to the highest (“worst”) possible outcome. Formally, this proportional 
cumulative logit model can be described as:  
 
 
Where Y is the response variable, i is the ranked value of the response 
variable, β0i is the intercept associated with rank i, and βj is the parameter 
estimate associated with explanatory variable xj. Thus, the model can be read as 
“the log-odds-ratio of observing a response of rank i or lower is a function of its 
intercept log-odds ratio plus the sum of the relevant parameter estimates times 
their respective explanatory variables.” The intercept parameters are estimated 
for each ranked level of the response variable except for the highest (reference) 
rank, and the estimated value represents the log-odds ratio of observing that 
particular rank (or lower) relative to the highest (reference) rank, given all other 
 
 46. Alain F. Zuur, Elana N. Ieno & Chris S. Elphick. A protocol for data exploration to avoid 
common statistical problems. 1 METHODS IN ECOLOGY AND EVOLUTION 3 (2010). 
 47. WALTER STROUP, GENERALIZED LINEAR MIXED MODELS, 398–404 (2012). 
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fixed effects are set at zero (i.e. no argument, no reply, and ln(1)=0 sources, 
issues, pages, etc. . . .). The fixed effect parameters represent the increased log-
odds ratio of observing a lower-ranked response for every one unit increase of 
the fixed effect. In the case of the categorical predictors REPLY and ARGHELD 
(which are coded 0 or 1), a positive parameter estimate would suggest that the 
presence of that variable (e.g. holding a reply or argument) is associated with an 
increased probability of having a lower (or “better”) ranking. Similarly, a 
positive parameter estimate for a numerical dependent variable indicates that 
each loge-fold increase in the dependent variable (or 2.7x increase on the original 
scale, because they were loge-transformed) is associated with an increased log-
odds ratio of having a lower-ranked (“better”) response. We also include the 
squares of each numerical variable, such as lnNUMSRCS2, which allows the 
model to test for quadratic, or curvilinear, effects. The presence of both a linear 
term (whose parameter estimate we’ll call α) and also its corresponding 
quadratic term (whose parameter estimate we’ll call β) would suggest that the 
log-odds relationship is curved up or down and has some intermediate apex. The 
location of the apex, along the log-transformed explanatory variable, should be 
at -α/2β (or, at exp(-α/2β) along the original, non-transformed explanatory 
variable) and the log-odds curve should open up if β is positive, and down if β 
is negative. 
Because of the possibility of multicollinearity between the explanatory 
variables, the cumulative logit models were constructed in a stepwise selection 
using Akaike Information Criterion as the stop criteria. Akaike Information 
Criterion (“AIC”) is a likelihood-based information-theoretic index that 
describes the quality (or “information content”) of a model, after penalty for the 
number of parameters in the model, with lower values indicating a better fit. In 
stepwise selection, the model begins with no fixed effects and computes only 
the intercepts for each ranked response. At each subsequent iteration of the 
algorithm, the model takes on the best most explanatory variable, but only if that 
variable reduces (improves) the AIC score.48 The stepwise model also has the 
option to exclude a previously included variable if removal improves the AIC 
score. This stepwise selection approach is designed to select only the 
explanatory variables that best explain the response variable and is a partial 
control on multicollinearity because the AIC (like other information-theoretic 
indices) includes a penalty for excessive number of parameters without 
improvement in fit. For example, if variables A and B are highly correlated with 
C, it would be preferable to select a model with only the one best (most 
explanatory) variable, if they are indeed redundant. In this case, it would be 
conceivable for the stepwise model to include variable A in the first round, 
 
 48. The variables that the model has to choose from includes both categorical variables, all of 
the log-transformed numerical variables, and also squares of all of the log-transformed numerical 
variables to account for possible quadratic effects. 
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include variable B in the second round, C in the third round, and then remove 
variable A and B in subsequent rounds if they essentially contain comparable 
information to variable C. This stepwise model selection was conducted for each 
of the ranked response variables using PROC HPGENSELECT (Statistical 
Analysis Software, SAS Institute, Cary, NC). McFadden’s pseudo-R2 was 
computed as R2M = 1-(LogLM/LogLN) where LogLM is the log-likelihood of the 
final model and LogLN is the log-likelihood of the null model (intercepts only, 
no fixed effects). Here is the analyzed procedure of our stepwise selection: 
TABLE 1: PROCEDURE OF STEPWISE SELECTION 
Selection Details for HOLDINGRANK 
Step Description 
Effects 
In Model Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq -2 LogL AIC   
0 Initial Model 1   866.962 870.962   
1 ARGHELD entered 2 31.1292 <.0001 834.547 840.547   
2 lnNUMSRCS entered 3 9.0245 0.0027 825.243 833.243   
3 lnNUMSRCS2 entered 4 4.4556 0.0348 819.791 829.791   
 Pseudo-R2McFadden    0.054    
Selection Details for OPINIONRANK 
Step Description 
Effects 
In Model Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq -2 LogL AIC   
0 Initial Model 1   1424.150 1432.150   
1 ARGHELD entered 2 243.9218 <.0001 1150.664 1160.664   
2 REPLY entered 3 15.1409 <.0001 1135.333 1147.333   
3 lnARGPAGES entered 4 3.9394 0.0472 1131.375 1145.375   
4 lnARGPAGES2 
entered 
5 7.3057 0.0069 1123.691 1139.691   
 Pseudo-R2McFadden    0.211    
Selection Details for OUTCOMERANK 
Step Description 
Effects 
In Model Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq -2 LogL AIC   
0 Initial Model 1   2154.634 2172.634   
1 ARGHELD entered 2 191.4836 <.0001 1948.165 1968.165   
2 REPLY entered 3 24.0361 <.0001 1923.768 1945.768   
3 lnNUMSRCS entered 4 8.5557 0.0034 1915.167 1939.167   
4 lnNUMSRCS2 entered 5 7.1093 0.0077 1907.283 1933.283   
 Pseudo-R2McFadden    0.115    
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III.  RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
Based on this data analysis, we made three initial determinations. 
First, all of the seven numerical dependent variables were positively skewed 
in their frequency distribution and would therefore be more appropriately 
modeled through natural-log transformations so that they approximated a normal 
distribution (log-transformed variables now have “ln” in front of the original 
variable name). 
Second, four numerical dependent variables in particular showed strong 
evidence of collinearity (lnNUMSRCS, lnNUMISSUES, lnARGPAGES, 
lnTOTALWDS): 
FIGURE 1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Scatterplot matrix between four loge-transformed numeric 
variables (lnNUMSRCS = number of sources, lnNUMISSUES = number of 
issues, lnARGPAGES = argument pages, and lnTOTALWDS = total words) that 
appear to be mutually colinear. Frequency histograms along the diagonal 
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illustrate that most variables are approximately normally distributed after loge-
transformation. 
Third, the frequency of REPLY and ARGHELD was not random: briefs 
holding an argument also tended to have a reply more often than would be 
expected by chance (Fig. 2, χ2 = 130.62, p < 0.0001).  
FIGURE 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Vertical barchart showing the uneven distribution of cases that did 
(=1) or did not (=0) hold an argument (ARGHELD) or reply (REPLY). 
All of the integer dependent variables appeared to be drawn from a negative 
binomial distribution, with values of Pearson’s χ2 / DF in the range of 1.00 to 
1.22.49 The two dependent variables that are ratios (PGPERARG and 
WDSPERISS) appeared to be drawn from a gamma distribution but were 
somewhat underdispersed (with Pearson’s χ2 / DF values of 0.52 and 0.70, 
respectively). The two categorical dependent variables (ARGHELD and 
REPLY) were drawn from a binary distribution with a probability of success (π) 
= 50.88 and 67.57, respectively. The mean and scale (dispersion) value for these 
variables are reported in Table 2: 
  
 
 49. 1.00 is ideal, greater than 2.0 generally suggests poor fit due to overdispersion. 
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TABLE 2: MEAN AND SCALE OF NUMERICAL VARIABLES 
VARIABLE DISTRIBUTION MEAN (µ/π) SCALE (Φ) 
NUMSRCS NEGATIVEBINOMIAL 33.56 0.323 
NUMISSUES NEGATIVEBINOMIAL 2.37 0.092 
WDSPERISS GAMMA 38.33 0.400 
STMTPAGES NEGATIVEBINOMIAL 6.69 0.562 
ARGPAGES NEGATIVEBINOMIAL 16.94 0.399 
PGPERARG GAMMA 8.35 0.378 
TOTALWDS NEGATIVEBINOMIAL 6705.70 0.315 
    
ARGHELD BINARY 50.88 NA 
REPLY BINARY 67.57 NA 
*For X~NB(µ,Φ) Var(X)=µ+Φµ2 
*For X~G(µ,Φ) Var(X)=Φµ2 
*For X~B(π) Var(X)= π(1- π) 
In the stepwise selection model analysis, we made three additional 
determinations. 
First, we determined that ARGHELD (p=0.0003), lnNUMSRCS 
(p=0.0169), and lnNUMSRCS2 (p=0.0324) were selected as statistically 
significant explanatory variables for HOLDINGRANK (Table 3). Thus, holding 
an argument was positively associated with increased odds of having a better 
HOLDINGRANK (Fig. 3), while the number of sources exhibited a quadratic 
relationship with HOLDINGRANK: increasing number of sources was 
positively associated with increased odds of having a better HOLDINGRANK 
up to approximately exp(-4.62/(2*-0.59))= 50 sources, at which point additional 
sources reduced the odds of having a better HOLDINGRANK (Fig. 4). Thus, 
the model for predicting the odds ratio of HOLDINGRANK is:  
 
 
 
                                                              , where Intercepti is the Intercept 
from Table 3 corresponding to the desired level i of HOLDINGRANK. 
Second, we determined that REPLY (p=0.0029), ARGHELD (p<0.0001) 
lnARGPAGES (p=0.0028), and lnARGPAGES2 (p=0.0073) were selected as 
statistically significant explanatory variables for OPINIONRANK (Table 3). 
Thus, holding an argument and having a reply were both associated with 
decreased odds of having a better OPINIONRANK, while the number of sources 
exhibited a quadratic relationship with OPINIONRANK: increasing number of 
argument pages was associated with decreased odds of having a stronger 
OPINIONRANK up to approximately exp(-2.1/(2*-0.37))= 16.7 pages, at which 
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point additional pages increased the odds of having a weaker OPINIONRANK. 
Thus, the model for predicting the odds ratio of OPINIONRANK is:  
 
 
 
                                                                                                           , where 
Intercepti is the Intercept from Table 3 corresponding to the desired level i of 
OPINIONRANK. 
Third, we determined that REPLY (p=0.0002), ARGHELD (p<0.0001), 
lnNUMSRCS (p=0.0027), and lnNUMSRCS2 (p=0.0078) were statistically 
significant explanatory variables for OUTCOMERANK (Table 3). Thus, 
holding an argument and having a reply was positively associated with increased 
odds of having a better OUTCOMERANK, while the number of sources 
exhibited a quadratic relationship with OUTCOMERANK: increasing number 
of sources was positively associated with increased odds of having a better 
OUTCOMERANK up to approximately exp(-2.98/(2*-0.40))= 41.5 sources, at 
which point additional sources reduced the odds of having a better 
OUTCOMERANK. Thus, the model for predicting the odds ratio of 
OUTCOMRANK is:  
 
 
 
                                                                                     , where Intercepti is 
the Intercept from Table 3 corresponding to the desired level i of 
OUTCOMERANK. 
TABLE 3: FINAL MODELS 
Parameter Estimates for HOLDINGRANK 
Parameter HOLDINGRANK DF Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
95% 
Confidence 
Limits Chi-Square 
Pr >  
ChiSq 
Intercept 1 1 -11.346538 3.347754 -17.90802 -4.78506 11.4873 0.0007 
Intercept 2 1 -10.778246 3.346012 -17.33631 -4.22018 10.3763 0.0013 
lnNUMSRCS  1 4.623976 1.935096 0.83126 8.41669 5.7099 0.0169 
lnNUMSRCS2  1 -0.590204 0.275856 -1.13087 -0.04954 4.5776 0.0324 
ARGHELD  1 0.848394 0.233075 0.39158 1.30521 13.2497 0.0003 
Parameter Estimates for OPINIONRANK 
Parameter OPINIONRANK DF Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
95% 
Confidence 
Limits Chi-Square 
Pr > 
ChiSq 
Intercept 1 1 3.260176 0.851913 1.59046 4.92989 14.6451 0.0001 
Intercept 2 1 7.677157 0.888989 5.93477 9.41954 74.5775 <.0001 
Intercept 3 1 8.036950 0.892237 6.28820 9.78570 81.1376 <.0001 
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Parameter Estimates for HOLDINGRANK 
Parameter HOLDINGRANK DF Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
95% 
Confidence 
Limits Chi-Square 
Pr >  
ChiSq 
Intercept 4 1 9.080762 0.912642 7.29202 10.86951 99.0020 <.0001 
lnARGPAGES  1 -2.101178 0.704124 -3.48124 -0.72112 8.9049 0.0028 
lnARGPAGES2  1 0.373124 0.139169 0.10036 0.64589 7.1882 0.0073 
REPLY  1 -0.598983 0.201124 -0.99318 -0.20479 8.8695 0.0029 
ARGHELD  1 -2.617620 0.242928 -3.09375 -2.14149 116.1068 <.0001 
Parameter Estimates for OUTCOMERANK 
Parameter OUTCOMERANK DF Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
95% 
Confidence 
Limits Chi-Square 
Pr >  
ChiSq 
Intercept 1 1 -10.937177 1.657608 -14.18603 -7.68833 43.5358 <.0001 
Intercept 2 1 -9.666826 1.646949 -12.89479 -6.43887 34.4514 <.0001 
Intercept 3 1 -9.634253 1.646796 -12.86191 -6.40659 34.2260 <.0001 
Intercept 5 1 -9.452910 1.645988 -12.67899 -6.22683 32.9820 <.0001 
Intercept 6 1 -8.864597 1.644060 -12.08690 -5.64230 29.0725 <.0001 
Intercept 7 1 -8.715396 1.643676 -11.93694 -5.49385 28.1153 <.0001 
Intercept 8 1 -8.621214 1.643395 -11.84221 -5.40022 27.5203 <.0001 
Intercept 9 1 -8.494391 1.643041 -11.71469 -5.27409 26.7281 <.0001 
Intercept 10 1 -5.586379 1.628452 -8.77809 -2.39467 11.7682 0.0006 
lnNUMSRCS  1 2.981676 0.995666 1.03021 4.93314 8.9680 0.0027 
lnNUMSRCS2  1 -0.396322 0.149019 -0.68839 -0.10425 7.0731 0.0078 
REPLY  1 0.688649 0.183096 0.32979 1.04751 14.1462 0.0002 
ARGHELD  1 1.855179 0.192538 1.47781 2.23255 92.8408 <.0001 
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FIGURE 3: HOLDINGRANK AS INFLUENCED BY ARGHELD  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Vertical barchart showing that cases that did hold an argument 
(ARGHELD =1) tended to have fewer of the least desirable HOLDINGRANK 
(=3, petition affirmed or dismissed) and more of the preferable levels of 
HOLDINGRANK (=1&2 petition reversed or remanded in whole or in part). 
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FIGURE 4: HOLDINGRANK AS INFLUENCED BY LNNUMSRCS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Scatter plot showing the HOLDINGRANK of cases (vertical axis) 
relative to their number of sources (NUMSRCS, horizontal axis, note the log-
scale). The curves represent the model predicted probability of a case having an 
improved HOLDINGRANK of 1 or 2 (i.e. not 3) as a quadratic function of 
lnNUMSRCS; the solid line represents the probabilities for cases that did not 
hold an argument (ARGHELD=0), while the dashed line represents the 
probabilities for cases that did hold an argument (ARGHELD=1). In general, the 
probability of experiencing a HOLDINGRANK of 1 or 2 (petition reversed or 
remanded in whole or in part) is low, but this probability is highest at around 
fifty sources. 
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FIGURE 5: OPINIONRANK AS INFLUENCED BY ARGHELD  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Vertical barchart showing that cases that did hold an argument 
(ARGHELD =1) tended to have fewer of the strongest level of OPINIONRANK 
(1= per curiam) and more of the weaker levels of OPINIONRANK (4 & 5 = 
signed with dissent, whole or in part). 
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FIGURE 6: OPINIONRANK AS INFLUENCED BY LNARGPAGES  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Scatter plot showing the OPINIONRANK of cases (vertical axis) 
relative to their number of argument pages (ARGPAGES, horizontal axis, note 
the log-scale). The curves represent the model predicted probability of a case 
having an OPINIONRANK of 1, 2, or 3 (i.e. not 4 or 5) as a quadratic function 
of lnARGPAGES; the solid line (not clearly visible on this graph) represents the 
probabilities for cases that did not hold an argument (ARGHELD=0), while the 
dashed line represents the probabilities for cases that did hold an argument 
(ARGHELD=1). In general, the probability of experiencing a OPINIONRANK 
of 1, 2, or 3 (per curiam, or sign unanimous or with concurrence) is high, but 
this probability is lowest/weakest at around 16.7 pages. 
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FIGURE 7: OUTCOMERANK AS INFLUENCED BY ARGHELD  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Vertical barchart showing that cases that did hold an argument 
(ARGHELD =1) tended to have fewer of the least desireable levels of 
OUTCOMERANK and more of the preferable levels of OUTCOMERANK. 
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FIGURE 8: OUTCOMERANK AS INFLUENCED BY LNNUMSRCS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Scatter plot showing the OUTCOMERANK of cases (vertical 
axis) relative to their number of sources (NUMSRCS, horizontal axis, note the 
log-scale). The curves represent the model predicted probability of a case having 
an improved OUTCOMERANK of 1 to 6 as a quadratic function of 
lnNUMSRCS; the solid line represents the probabilities for cases that did not 
hold an argument (ARGHELD=0), while the dashed line represents the 
probabilities for cases that did hold an argument (ARGHELD=1). In general, the 
probability of experiencing a OUTCOMERANK of 1 to 6 is low, but this 
probability is highest at around forty-three sources. 
CONCLUSION: EXPLANATIONS, THEORIES, THEMES, AND A PATH FORWARD 
Our results do not lend strong support for most of the “folk wisdom” 
advising against lengthy, wordy briefs with numerous arguments and sources, 
but they also do not necessarily refute other recommendations. For example, 
holding an argument was associated with more preferable holdings and overall 
outcomes (but weaker opinions), and this is in support of Rachel Clark Hughey’s 
observation that oral arguments do matter to some judges. Similarly, having a 
reply brief was also associated with weaker opinions but more preferable overall 
outcomes, in support of the recommendations to always submit a reply brief. 
Interestingly, the positive coefficient associated with lnNUMSRCSs leads to the 
interpretation that citing a higher number of sources (to a point) is associated 
with better odds of obtaining a more preferable holding. 
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It must be emphasized here that a major caveat of this study is that the 
experimental design is essentially mensurative and not manipulative50 in the 
sense that the explanatory variables (ARGHELD, REPLY, NUMSRCS, 
ARGPAGES, etc…) were simply measured from actual cases, and not 
manipulated experimentally. This bears with it the obvious implication that our 
statistical models cannot imply causation, but rather merely association. For 
example, we cannot say (in the case of Fig. 4) that cases holding an argument 
had a higher probability of more preferable holding because they held an 
argument, for we do not necessarily know whether holding an argument is not 
confounded with other attributes (that may not have been measured) such as the 
knowledge or experience of the legal representation, or, of course, because of 
the merits of the appellant’s case. Instead, all we can say is that holding an 
argument was associated with a higher probability of more preferable holdings. 
It might seem counterintuitive that ARGHELD and REPLY have different 
coefficients for OPINIONRANK and OUTCOMERANK. Holding an argument 
and having a reply brief appears to be associated with weaker opinions, but more 
preferable overall outcomes. Since most appeals are affirmed, denied, or 
dismissed, perhaps weaker OPINIONRANK is actually better (from the 
perspective of the appellant), as an indicator that the appellant’s work in 
submitting a reply brief and participating in oral argument introduced a seed of 
“doubt” in the panel. 
It is surprising that lnARGPAGES was included in the stepwise selection 
model of OPINIONRANK, despite not being included in either of the models 
for HOLDINGRANK or OUTCOMERANK. However, this makes more sense 
in the light of the strong positive correlation (r=0.7859, p<0.0001) between 
lnNUMSRCS and lnARGPAGES (as well as with lnNUMISSUES and 
lnTOTALWDS, see Fig. 1). In general, briefs with a high number of sources 
also tend to have a high number of issues, a high number of pages in their 
argument, and a high number of total words. In the context of a stepwise 
selection, lnARGPAGES (containing some of the variance, or “information,” 
associated with the other three variables) was sufficiently explanatory to 
improve the AIC of the OPINIONRANK model and be included in the overall 
final reduced model. 
In fact, since lnNUMSRCS has positive coefficients associated with 
HOLDINGRANK and OUTCOMERANK, while lnARGPAGES has a negative 
coefficient associated with OPINIONRANK, it would appear that heavily 
sourced briefs are associated with more preferable holdings and overall 
outcomes, while lengthy arguments are associated with weaker opinions. 
This appears to be contrary to the “folk wisdom” of avoiding lengthy or 
verbose briefs, but we’ll remind the reader of two things. First, the coefficients 
 
 50. Stuart H. Hurlbert, Pseudoreplication and the Design of Ecological Field Experiments, 54 
ECOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS 187 (1984). 
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associated with lnARGPAGES and lnNUMSRCS are relatively small, meaning 
that incremental increases on a natural log scale (or about 2.7-fold increases on 
a linear scale) increase the odds of improved holdings (or weakened opinions) a 
very small amount. Second, many of the briefs with the greater number of 
sources (i.e. over fifty) still have the least preferable holdings or overall 
outcomes (Figs. 4, 8), suggesting that it may still be true that a greater number 
of sources may be beneficial up to a point, at which an excessive number of 
sources may be detrimental. 
Perhaps the most important insight that can be drawn from our study is that 
the folk wisdom regarding appellate briefs either isn’t indicated, or where it is 
indicated, it is only weakly correlated with outcome success. There are, 
however, six conclusions that can be drawn based on the statistically significant 
relationships we discovered. 
First, an increased number of sources cited (up to a point) plus having an 
oral argument held is positively correlated with better holdings. This reflects the 
folk wisdom that oral arguments are good for appellants but rejects the folk 
wisdom that fewer sources are better (which is, to be sure, not an opinion shared 
by everyone). 
Second, the folk wisdom regarding limiting the number is sources is borne 
out where the number of sources is extremely high, which is associated with 
worse holdings and overall outcomes. 
Third, the folk wisdom that encourages the filing of a reply brief is probably 
well-founded but may be less impactful than proponents think. When coupled 
with a large number of sources (up to a point) and an oral argument, reply briefs 
are associated with better overall outcomes. Specifically, a reply approximately 
doubles the odds-ratio of an improved outcome, while holding an argument 
increases the odds-ratio of an improved outcome by 6.4-fold. 
Fourth, a higher number of argument pages (up to a point) is associated with 
weaker opinions, even if this higher number is a proxy for other variables, such 
as number of sources cited. 
Attorneys should, therefore, take with a healthy grain of salt the advice that 
their appellate briefs should reflect the particular quantitative mandates of the 
advice-givers. This advice is, at best, weakly correlated with outcome success, 
and thus more likely reflects the a priori preferences and assumptions of the 
advice-givers. 
The data does, however, suggest that attorneys who brief their cases well 
and pursue all possible procedural avenues will, all things being equal, fare 
better, where briefing a case well means unearthing and utilizing all relevant 
sources, and where pursuing all possible procedural avenues means filing a reply 
brief and participating in oral argument. 
This insight, however, may be limited in two ways. First, appeals that are 
well-briefed and engage all possible procedural avenues may be positively 
correlated with highly meritorious underlying cases. This makes sense. 
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Attorneys are trained to recognize meritorious cases, and may tend to devote 
more time and attention to such cases, leading to the use of more sources, the 
submission of a reply brief, and participation in oral argument. 
Second, appeals that are well-briefed and engage all possible procedural 
avenues may be subject to the political preferences of appellate court panels. 
Some scholars believe that these preferences inform appellate decision-making 
better than any other factor. The correlation, however, between appeals that are 
well-briefed and procedurally complete and judges’ political leanings intuitively 
seems absent. If politics drives judges’ decision-making, the quality of the brief 
and completeness of the procedure shouldn’t be a relevant variable. 
The next research step, then, would be to compare the nature of appellate 
briefs, as analyzed in this article, with the qualitative merit of the underlying 
case. This step would first require the creation of a set of quantifiable variables 
that effectively reflects the substantive merit of the underlying case. This set 
would comprise the independent variables of this new study. The 
HOLDINGRANK, OPINIONRANK, and OUTCOMERANK established in 
this article’s study would comprise the dependent variables. The insight gleaned 
from this proposed study could be valuable in itself. The second step, then, 
would be to ask whether there is a positive correlation between the relevant 
variables for appellate briefs established in our current study with the relevant 
variables established in this second proposed study. The outcome of this 
comparison should reveal whether the quality of appellate briefs increases or 
decreases the odds of outcome success, whether or not the underlying case is 
relatively meritorious or non-meritorious. 
*  *  * 
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APPENDIX A: CODEBOOK 
CASENUM: Provides the Eighth Circuit’s assigned case number (ex.: 
16-1907). If the case lists more than one case number, the 
first listed case number is used. If that case does not permit 
access to the briefs or if the appellant’s brief is otherwise 
unavailable via PACER, “Briefs unavail” is entered under 
NUMSRCS. If the brief is pro se, “Pro se” is entered under 
NUMSRCS. If the brief is an Anders brief and the court 
affirmed, finding no non-frivolous issues, dismissed the 
appeal, or otherwise made no dispositive ruling, 
“AndersAff” is entered under NUMSRCS. 
NUMSRCS: The total number of sources cited in the brief (taking by 
counting all of the sources in the Table of Authorities 
section). 
20=20 
30=30 
35=35 
Etc. 
NUMISSUES: The number of issues the appellant asserts, as set forth in 
the statement of issues (determined by counting the formal 
number of issues the appellant argues. Does not account 
for multiple issues within each formal issue). 
1=1 
2=2 
3=3 
Etc. 
WDSPERISS: The average number of words per issue statement (taken 
by adding all of the words in the issue statements in the 
Statement of the Issue(s) section, and dividing by the total 
NUMISSUES). 
20=20 
30=30 
35=35 
Etc. 
STMTPAGES: The total number of pages in the statement of the case 
(taken by subtracting the page number on which the 
statement of the case starts from the page number on which 
the statement of the case ends). Where there is a separate 
“statement of the case” and “statement of the facts” 
section, the page numbers for both sections are counted. 
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2=2 
4=4 
7=7 
Etc. 
ARGPAGES: The total number of pages in the argument (taken by 
subtracting the page number on which the argument starts 
from the page number on which the argument ends). 
2=2 
4=4 
7=7 
Etc. 
PGPERARG: The average number of pages per issue in the argument 
(taking by dividing ARGPAGES by NUMISSUES). 
2=2 
4=4 
7=7 
Etc. 
TOTALWDS: The total number of words in the entire brief (as provided 
in the certificate of compliance). If the total number of 
words is listed as “less than xxx,” xxx is entered. Thus, if 
counsel certifies that the brief is “less than 4,000 words,” 
4,000 is entered. Where the length of the brief is described 
in page numbers rather than words, that number is 
multiplied by 230. If the brief’s count is by line numbers, 
multiply that number by 13. 
5000=5000 
10000=10000 
15000=15000 
Etc. 
REPLY: Did the appellant file a Reply Brief (found on the Eighth 
Circuit’s general docket sheet for each page)? If the 
original brief was submitted by counsel, but the reply brief 
was pro se, 2 is entered. 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
ARGHELD: Did the Eighth Circuit hold an oral argument (found on the 
Eighth Circuit’s general docket sheet for each page)? 
1 = Yes 
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2 = No (includes an initial determination of no argument 
and an initial set argument later cancelled by the 
Court) 
OPINION: What type of opinion was issued (found on the Eighth 
Circuit’s general docket sheet)? Ranked as 
OPINIONRANK. 
1 = Per curiam 
2 = Signed, unanimous 
3 = Signed, with concurrence 
4 = Signed, with dissent 
5 = Memorandum 
6 = Signed, with concurrence and dissent (includes 
concurrences in part and dissents in part) 
HOLDING: What was the court’s holding (found on the Eighth 
Circuit’s general docket sheet) 
(note: these code variables are taken from the Appellate 
Court Database)? Ranked as HOLDINGRANK 
0 = Stay, petition, or motion granted 
1 = Affirmed; or affirmed and petition denied 
2 = Reversed (include reversed and vacated) 
3 = Reversed and remanded (or just remanded) 
4 = Vacated and remanded (also set aside and remanded; 
modified and remanded) 
5 = Affirmed in part and reversed in part (or modified or 
affirmed and modified) 
6 = Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; 
affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded 
7 = Vacated 
8 = Petition denied or appeal dismissed 
9 = Certification to another court 
10 = Not ascertained 
OUTCOMERANK: A ranked combination of HOLDING and OPINION: 
1 = Per curiam reversed; reversed and remanded/vacated; vacated; 
remanded; or vacated and remanded (where OPINION=1 and 
HOLDING=2, 3, 4, or 7); 
2 = Signed, unanimous reversed; reversed and remanded/vacated; vacated; 
remanded; or vacated and remanded (where OPINION=2 and 
HOLDING=2, 3, 4, or 7); 
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3 = Signed, with concurrence reversed; reversed and remanded/vacated; 
vacated; remanded; or vacated and remanded (where OPINION=3 and 
HOLDING=2, 3, 4, or 7); 
4 = Signed, with concurrence and dissent reversed; reversed and 
remanded/vacated; vacated; remanded; or vacated and remanded 
(where OPINION=6 and HOLDING=2, 3, 4, or 7); 
5 = Signed, with dissent reversed; reversed and remanded/vacated; 
vacated; remanded; or vacated and remanded (where OPINION=4 and 
HOLDING=2, 3, 4, or 7); 
6 = Per curiam affirmed in part and reversed in part (where OPINION=1 
and HOLDING=5); 
6 = Signed, unanimous affirmed in part and reversed in part (where 
OPINION=2 and HOLDING=5); 
6 = Signed, with concurrence affirmed in part and reversed in part (where 
OPINION=3 and HOLDING=5); 
6 = Signed, with concurrence and dissent affirmed in part and reversed in 
part (where OPINION=6 and HOLDING=5); 
6 = Signed, with dissent affirmed in part and reversed in part (where 
OPINION=4 and HOLDING=5); 
6 = Per curiam affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded (where 
OPINION=1 and HOLDING=6); 
6 = Signed, unanimous affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded 
(where OPINION=2 and HOLDING=6); 
6 = Signed, with concurrence affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded (where OPINION=3 and HOLDING=6);  
6 = Signed, with concurrence and dissent affirmed in part, reversed in part, 
and remanded (where OPINION=6 and HOLDING=6); 
6 = Signed, with dissent affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded 
(where OPINION=4 and HOLDING=6); 
7 = Signed, with dissent affirmance, petition denied, or appeal dismissed 
(where OPINION=4 and HOLDING=1 or 8); 
8 = Signed, with concurrence and dissent affirmance, petition denied, or 
appeal dismissed (where OPINION=6 and HOLDING=1 or 8); 
9 = Signed, with concurrence affirmance, petition denied, or appeal 
dismissed (where OPINION=3 and HOLDING=1 or 8); 
10 = Signed, unanimous affirmance, petition denied, or appeal dismissed 
(where OPINION=2 and HOLDING=1 or 8); 
11 = Per curiam affirmance, petition denied, or appeal dismissed (where 
OPINION=1 and HOLDING=1 or 8). 
*  *  *  
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